

## INTRODUCTION

It is 05:40 hundred hours, (sixty one minutes after dawn), Sunday 21st July 1861. The battle of (First) Bull Run (or Manassas)•• has already begun. Brigadier General Daniel Tyler sounded reveille for his division at 02:00 hundred hours. Thousands of men have been on the move under the diffusing moonlight since 03:00 hours. Sometime around 04:30 hundred hours the first small arms fire happened. In the pre-dawn half-light two Confederate videttes fired at some of Tyler's skirmishers before spurring their horses away. The game starts seventy minutes later and ends fifteen hours after that at 20:40 hundred hours (ten minutes after sunset). The action took place in the North American state of Virginia. In the country between Chestnut Lick in the north west, and the Occoquan River and Fairfax railway station in the south east. In Prince William County. The battlefield map represents an area of circa 160 square miles (414 square kilometres). Superimposed on it is a hexagonal grid. Each hexagon represents an area circa of one hundred and ten yards (circa one hundred metres diameter) across.

Each picture of an infantryman, artilleryman, flag bearer, cavalryman or horse represents one man or one horse. There are also pictures for individual smoothbore or rifled artillery pieces.

A player is allowed to take five minutes to play a turn. This turn represents five minutes of battle time. It is a remorseless pace. If you are close to the enemy you won't have much time to think things through. Regimental movement *en masse* will often be necessary simply because you will not have time to move companies individually. At the completion of a turn play halts for the server to calculate new dispositions. This takes circa ten minutes.

### COMPANIES I

Infantry are grouped into companies of between 76 and 84 men. This assumes that 20% of the paper strength of an infantry company (nominally 101 men in the U.S. Army) were absent on the day of the battle. Union cavalry are grouped into companies of 72 men each. The figure of 72 reflects the notion that 18% of the paper strength of the US cavalry company (88 men) were absent on the day of the battle. Confederate Cavalry are grouped into companies of 64 men. The figure of 64 assumes that 15% of the paper strength of a cavalry company (there was no fixed paper strength for Confederate cavalry in July 1861

The game is fought to completion in twelve weekly episodes each episode represents one and a quarter hours of the battle (fifteen turns) and so takes three and three quarter hours to play (allowing for two hours server processing time). Server processing time will vary (from circa seven to thirteen minutes depending on how much is going on). Each episode starts at 06:00 hours Pacific Standard (Los Angeles) Time, 14:00 hundred hours. Greenwich Mean (London) Time and 12:00 midnight Kilo (Brisbane) Time on a Saturday.

Orders and despatches use the *US Declaration* font. Map labels and terrain features use Gauge font. Order menus & unit names Munson font. This rule book Optima font ●●●

This book is available in game as are key tables distilling the information in the rule book into a handier form. There are videos ([www.historicalengineering.com/drillsessions.php](http://www.historicalengineering.com/drillsessions.php)), three considering how to play (how to move, how to fight and other matters) and two considering how to win (specifically as the Confederacy and as the Union), [on Youtube](#).

## DIVISIONS

Regiments are grouped mostly into brigades. Usually commanded by a Brigadier-General with two to four regiments per brigade. Brigades are not manoeuvred as a single unit. In order to manoeuvre a brigade (or higher unit such as a Federal division) multiple players have to collaborate or failing that at least follow orders.

## COMPANIES II

but 75 men was average), were sick or absent on the Sunday of the battle. On 8 July 1861 the actual combined infantry and cavalry figure in the Confederate Army of the Potomac (Beauregard's) was 18% under strength.

Companies are the basic manoeuvring unit of the game. Although players control the number of sections (each company has four) deployed to the skirmish line, and issue orders to individual flag parties and officers most orders are issued to the companies or perhaps even more often to regiments.

## REGIMENTS

Companies are grouped into regiments. It is possible to issue a manoeuvring (movement and deployment) order to whole regiments who then manoeuvre as a single unit. Indeed, with only five minutes to play each turn there often won't be time to issue orders to individual companies. A key reason why companies were drilled to manoeuvre as regiments in life was, as it is in the game, to speed things up for the commanding officer (usually a Colonel).



**FIGURE 3.**  
**A Federal First Lieutenant**

A Federal First Lieutenant in one of the more widespread July 1861 uniforms.

Officer hat cord was gold and infantry cord yellow.

For officers looped up on the right in accordance with the dress regulations of 1857.

The characteristic side arm was a six shot revolver.

## FOG OF WAR

A character of generalship, namely, insight despite ignorance, for example, because of the smoke and dust which obscured vision at First Bull Run even of what was close to hand, is at the heart of this game. As is the emphasis in my design on dealing with other people. In these ways the game is quite unlike, and more real than, many other computer games. Thirdly, the design is attentive to detail. Historical Engineering aims to bring the subject of its models to life, in part, by verisimilitude.


## REALISM

- The Brigade Commanders (Chain-of-Command)

At *First Bull Run* the Union Army of North Eastern Virginia attempted to outflank the Confederate Army of the Potomac reinforced by elements of the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah so combined into a new, as yet unnamed, army. This Union outflanking manoeuvre was of great promise but was frustrated. It was stymied by the fact that it took longer than planned. In a sense this was because it followed an unintended route a decision for which there was a logic, probably false, which in turn was brought on by the route not having been adequately scouted. Despite this the battle could easily have been a Union victory. In this sense the delay was not of itself decisive. More important was the initiative shown by certain Confederate brigade commanders. Perhaps most spectacularly by, as Colonel Cocke correctly referring to him by his pre-battle rank called him, "Major" Evans. Nathan Evans was referred to by his subordinates as "General" (he was promoted such circa November 1861). Evans referred to himself, in after action reports, as Colonel (he was brevet promoted such circa 25-Jul-61 confirmed circa

August 1861) and so this was not necessarily hubris. Regardless of how he was hailed Evans showed the initiative necessary to stall the Union threat. If Evans were to be criticised it would be for not following sooner his instinct to abandon the position he had been deployed, before the start of the battle, to defend. He was not alone among brigade commanders in seizing the initiative. Bee, Bartow and Jackson were also crucial, by acting decisively and beyond their orders, to the Confederate victory. Bee, for example, was ordered toward the Stone Bridge but took it upon himself, while in the latter stages of being en rout there, to move instead toward the sound of guns (to support Evans) arriving just in time to prevent the Confederate position being overwhelmed. Hampton, say and by contrast, albeit in his defence having only just arrived by a circuitous rout from Richmond, moved to support Evans by virtue of orders to do so from Beauregard. But Hampton too had already displayed some initiative by ordering his cavalry and guns to follow him independently by road from Richmond so that he could at least get his infantry to Manassas Junction faster by train and in time (which he did arriving about 02:30 hundred hours) for the battle.

Less locally, and earlier, General Johnston also showed initiative, in the nick of time (though it would have been more decisive if he had set off 24 hours earlier), by bringing most of the Army of the Shenandoah to the battlefield, to reinforce the Army of the Potomac, by train. Without this movement the Union would have won - perhaps spectacularly. Strategic redeployment by train on interior lines was an action first proposed (in the North American context) in writing, to his credit, by Colonel Cocke of whom it could be said, less generously, that at the battle he showed rather a lack of initiative. General Johnston slipped away from Harper's Ferry, fifty



**FIGURE 4.**  
**US Colours (Battle Flag)**



miles to the north west of Manassas, without the Union General Patterson (b. 1792 d. 1881)•••• who was deployed to his front realising that he had gone. Only in a game with players interacting at distance, and the breakdowns in communication this will cause, can the importance of individual initiative on the 19th century battlefield be brought alive.

- Aide de camp (Communications)

When players wish to communicate they must dispatch an aide-de-camp with written messages or move a played-for-character to talk. The flow of communication across the battlefield is constrained, as it was in reality, by the time it takes to do this and the skill with which authors state their case in writing or utterance (players can video chat when close on map). Only like this can the nature, and importance, of 19th century battlefield communications be made real.

- Fire by rank and mid 19th century tactics

Infantry officers sought to withhold fire for as long as possible in order to maximise fire effect by volleying at the shortest possible range for maximum effect before smoke got in the way. On the other hand, holding fire for too long might result in rout if the enemy fired first with sufficient effect especially if by doing so they blew smoke into your face. In this design, in which the emotions of general officers are decisive, such tactical weighing of the scales is represented.

Holding fire until the last moment was also vital in repelling bayonet charges but dangerous if one's own men bolted first. Bayonet charges rarely resulted in significant, or indeed any, casualties at First Bull Run. One side usually routed before the two came to blows. Therefore a sense of the morale of friend and foe was also characteristic of the better field commanders. For example, in the fighting for Matthews Hill most historians believe that Evans, who I was so careful to praise, threw Wheat's Tigers, the Louisiana Special battalion, that formed part of his demi-brigade at the Union Line because he thought it was wavering. This would have been timely if it had been true. And the attack did disrupt the Union attack that was preparing. But it only delayed the attack failed to rout the Union Line and instead broke the Tigers. The Tiger's then routed. Evan's misjudged Union morale.

- The Regiment

Infantry were drilled to act by section, platoon, company, regiment or brigade. Most fire and movement on the battlefield will have been by company or by regiment obeying orders that had been drilled into the men hitherto at least ideally. Regimental movement characterised warfare even though, as battles unfolded, regimental organisation tended to break down.

**TABLE 1. What if?****WHAT IF?**

**The base probability of Confederate independence is taken to be 12.4% in 1861, 10% in 1862, 7% in 1863, 2% in 1864, 0.1% in 1865**

In Theatre [Virginia (16,200), Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey (8,000 the three), Harpers Ferry (14,300) and Pennsylvania (15,700)]

A. Probability of Confederate (C.S.) independence following a C.S. victory, at First Bull Run, with a 25% chance of happening, twice as great as in reality - Union casualties & captured (6,200) and Confederate casualties (3,030). In this case 28,200 Union troops (of the initial 34,800) survive to fall back (with 9,200 reserves inc 7th Mas) on 3,800 militia (inc. 200 Clay Guards) in Washington giving it a garrison of 41,200 ●●●●●	x1.01% (12.6%)	28-Jul-1861 Federals 79,200 Confederates 46,200
B. Probability of C.S. independence as a consequence of a decisive Confederate military victory at First Bull Run, with a 6% chance of happening, four times as great as the real victory so with Union casualties (12,400) and Confederate casualties (4,040). In this case 22,400 Union troops survive Bull Run to fall back on Washington and make a garrison of 34,400 too formidable a force to assault if entrenched within Washington's fortifications.	x1.02% (12.7%)	28-Jul-1861 Federals 72,400 C.S. 45,200
C. Probability of independence as a consequence of a crushing Confederate military victory at First Bull Run, with a 2% chance of happening, eight times as great as the real victory so with Union casualties & captured (24,800) and Confederate casualties (5,050). In this case 10,000 Union troops survive Bull Run to fall back on Washington and make a garrison of 22,000. A siege, or high risk assault, of Washington would have been possible.	x1.06% (13.2%)	28-Jul-1861 Federals 60,000 C.S. 44,200
D. Probability of Confederate independence as a consequence of a Confederate 19th century Cannae at First Bull Run, with a 0.5% chance of happening, about ten times as great as the real victory so with Union casualties (31,000) and Confederate casualties (6,060). In this case 3,000 Union troops survive Bull Run to fall back on Washington and make a garrison of 15,000. In such a case Washington could have been taken by assault. But if not a siege would probably have been instituted. Moreover, such a victory might have sucked Federal reserves into the vortex so that Washington might have been left even more exposed. By 11-Aug-61 US reinforcements would be 2,000. Confederate 1,300.	x1.10% (13.7%)	11-Aug-1861 Federals 55,800 Confederates 44,500
E. Increased probability of C.S. independence if B (above) or C (above), result in the Confederacy occupying Maryland and Delaware including Wilmington (the largest place of Union warship construction ahead of Brooklyn), while putting Washington D.C. under seige. I take it if B happened there would have been a 10% chance of these outcomes by 11-Aug-61 and if C a 20% chance.	C+ Cx 1.07% (14.1%)	11-Aug-1861 Federals 63,200 Confederates 45,500
F. Increased probability of C.S. independence as a consequence of D (above) resulting in the Confederacy occupying Maryland, Delaware, including Wilmington, Washington D.C. New Jersey and the city of Philadelphia by 11-Aug-61 at a 20% chance.	D+ Dx 1.16% (15.9%)	11-Aug-1861 Federals 44,800 C.S. 45,500
G. Probability of C.S independence if D (above) resulted, with a 10%% probability, in the Confederacy occupying, by 18-Aug-61, Maryland, Delaware, including Wilmington, Washington D.C. New Jersey, the cities of Philadelphia, New York and Brooklyn	Dx 1.43% (19.6 %)	18-Aug-1861 Federals 41,800 C.S. 45,500
H. Probability of C.S. independence if D (above) resulted in the Confederacy occupying Maryland, Delaware, including Wilmington, Washington D.C. New Jersey, the cities of Philadelphia, New York and Brroklyn, and the states of Kentucky and Missouri	Gx 1.27% (24.8 %)	25-Aug-1861 Federals 41,600 C.S. 48,500
I. If Maj-Gen. Polk had, on 03-Sep-61, forbidden Brig-Gen. Pillow from enering Kentucky leading, at a 10% (the state was Unionist albeit 19.5% enslaved) chance, to Kentucky remaining neutral for twelve months longer until 04-Sep-1862. The impact is halved as Kentucky was moving towards intervention anyway so that Confederate restraint might not have made a difference.	x1.10% (13.56%)	
J. Probability if Davis had, in April 1861, purchased 400,000 bales of cotton for warehousing in England and gradual sale.	x1.02% (12.7%)	
K. If, in combination with G, Davis had, in Apr. 1861, purchased 400,000 bales of cotton for warehousing in England and gradual sale.	G x1.02 (20%)	
L .In March 1861 the Foreign Minister stated that Spain would recognise the C.S. if France did. Spain was afraid of the consequences of siding with the C.S. if the C.S lost. In March 1861 Spain annexed Santo Domingo which became a major distraction. As did Mexico (where Spain lead allied forces) from 12-Nov-1861. Spain would have recognised the C.S. if Spain thought the C.S would win.	x1.20% recognition (14.9%)	01-Aug-1861 (half of this 20% effect is deemed to be the effect on France)



**TABLE 2.**  
**More What if?**

**The base probability of Confederate independence is taken to be 12.4% in 1861, 10% in 1862, 7% in 1863, 2% in 1864, 0.1% in 1865**

**MORE WHAT IF?**

M. Effect of the Lincoln Administration not issuing the proclomation of emancipation until 01-Jan-1864. The military effect, owing to weaker Union forces as a result of no black enlistments (0.18 million of whom circa 0.07 million in 1863 and 0.15 million in 1864-5 in reality), is x 1.04. The effect owing to the greater probability of British recognition of the Confederacy is x 1.16 summed to x 1.2 and applied to G.	Base x 1.2 (14.9%)
N. If the Davis administration had authorised operations over the border, with Lee as field army commander, ten months earlier (May 1861) than it did (May 1862).	x1.5 (18.6%)
O. If the Lincoln Administration had issue the procolmation of emancipation on 01-Jan-1862 (as Secretary of Sate Seward favoured).	x0.84 (8.4%)
P. Effect on the probability of Confederate Independence if the Davis administration had authorised military operations over the border, with Jackson as field army commander, six months earlier (January 1862) than, it did. The assumption is that Jackson is a 20% better (less fond of the frontal assault) general than Lee but that the benefit of Lee being potentially given the main field command six months earlier than it could conceivably been given to Jackson offsets that by 80%.	x 1.56 (19.3%) Jackson
Q. If there had been no ban on the export of cotton from September to December 1861 and an all exports tariff of 12.5% the Confederacy could have obtained, circa, \$34 million p.a. from it. In fact the Confederacy enacted an import tarriff of 12.5% in May 1861. Of a hypothetical export tarriff on (\$40 million) of cotton the export ban would therefore have cost the government \$5 million. In practice the loss would have partially occurred anyway owing to the Union blockade which, we might estimate, would have caught circa 30% of exports (40% of weapons imports were caught in 1862) reducing de facto revenue loss to \$3.5 million. Assuming the economy accounted for 40% of the Union advantage a reduction in Confederate expenditure of \$1.5 million annualised amounts to circa 2.5% of the Confederate military economy in year one of the war (expenditure being circa \$50 million May to November 1861). This was, however, a hypothetical loss. The government did not propose a tarriff on exports but on imports. An absence of exports was not directly hurting its revenue at all. The measure will have indirectly hurt both confidence and the economy with a net effect on the war of, say, 0.5%. The more significant impact of the measure was the damage it did to relations with the British Empire where even a slight nudge in sentiment might have made the difference between recognition and not.	x 1.05 (13.0%)
R. If the French Empire had, at a 40% chance, allied with the CSA in Nov. 1861 or, with a 20% chance, from 07-Jan-62 (by which date 10,000 French troops were tied down at Vera Cruz which their, at the time, Spanish allies had secured 17-Dec-61). Alternatively, with a 13% chance, after the French invasion of Mexico began (18-Apr-62) and after the Union occupation (25-Apr-62) of New Orleans. Fourthly, from circa 15-Aug-62, after 30,000 French reinforcements reached Mexico (taking the forces in theatre to 40,000), with an 8% chance, and fifth, after the preliminary emancipation proclamation 22-Sep-62, with an 5% chance of France entering the war. Sixth at 4% in Feb. 1863. Of the 200% impact of French intervention in Nov. 1861 40% derives from the US navy being destroyed by the French and 20% from blockade breaking. 30% of the impact is from change in the naval balance of power. The 200% figure assumes initial French intervention would have been half hearted and that year one French infantry would not exceed 90,000 and never exceed 270,000 (in year three).	Nov 61' x 3.3 (40.9%), Jan 62' x3 (30%), Apr 62' x 2.6 (26%) Augt 62' x1.8 (18%), Sep 62' x1.7 (17%),
S. Probability if the British, at a 20% chance, entered the war as Confederate allies in November 1861, with a 6% chance from 01-Apr-62 or 2% chance from 22-Sep-1862. An intervention by both the French and British empires would increase the probability by +120% effect to the first three percentages in Q.	Nov 61' x 5 (62%), Apr 62' x
T. Probability of C.S. Independence if Dixie had embraced 5% emancipation. For example if, with effect from January 1862, two years earlier than was advocated (for all slaves) by Confederate Arkansas Major-General Patrick Cleburne (who was politely ignored) in January 1864, emancipation of male slaves aged 18-23 upon completion of a five year conscription had been implemented. The Confederate army would have been 12-16% larger.	x 1.25 (15.5%) 61'
U. Probability of Confederate Independence if the Seven Days Battles to 01-Jul-62 had led to the destruction, with a 10% chance of happening, of 90,000 Union troops for Confederate casualties of 30,000 (the reality was 18,000 Union casulaties for 19,000 Confederate). If Jackson had followed Lee's orders the chance of this happening would have been, say, 40%. Benefits in foreign reaction similar in wieght to military effect.	6% mili. + 6% fore. affa. = x 1.12 (12% 62')

This was because following practiced actions was simple and fast. Deployment orders in the game allow regiments to alter their formation and position in an orchestrated fashion often centred on the regimental colours as would have been the case in life with the same advantage of economy adhering to *en masse* action in play as in reality. The Drill manuals laid down where individual officers and non-commissioned officers should stand in relation to the line infantry. When players take advantage of regimental movement en masse, which they need not do, these drilled positions are adopted automatically by the men so that players can focus on war fighting rather than the minutiae of company movement. Although many of the regiments at the battle had received very little drill regiments were mostly mustered together so that men could identify themselves in regimental terms. Even without adequate drill when the regimental commander gave an order, repeated as applicable, by the line officers men would naturally tend to seek to obey it and if unsure look to those beside them who might know how to. So a universal high standard of training was not essential to ordered movement *en masse*.

## WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN

The idea has become popular that the Confederate States of America could not have won the American Civil War at the beginning on 21 July 1861 with a single devastating blow. The superior strength of the Union was bound to tell in the end. This idea has lent the events of the battle a patina of irrelevance.

- The idea of irrelevance is justified by reference to the US forces in reserve under New Jersey Brigadier-General Runyon in and around Washington D.C., which were indeed substantial (13,000 including 3,800 Washington D.C. militia and 2,800 of McCunn's brigade in Washington D.C. and 900 7th Massachusetts outside the capital as well as the 5,500 more directly under Runyon), as well as by reference to the troops under US Major-General Patterson on the Shenandoah (18,000) plus the much larger forces gathering and drilling across all the Unionist states. This is one. The balance of infantry power.
- The idea of inevitability is also justified by the hypothesis that the United States would still have fought on even if Washington D.C. and Maryland were lost in August 1861 which is no doubt true. It is two. The political will.



**FIGURE 5.**  
**Federal infantry**

A common Federal infantry uniform July 1861

Infantry were equipped with both muskets and rifled-muskets of diverse model ranging from circa 1810 to 1861.

The shell jacket was infantry issue until 1857, of wool, cotton or linen it was frequently worn in July 1861

The Federal forage cap 1859 was taller than the 1861 (or pre-1855) forage caps. In the field, dress, Hardee, hats were also often worn.

The US Sanitary Commission (a civilian organisation supporting the US Army) specified any dark colour but specifically not white socks. The Quartermaster's office described socks as grey but this was not necessarily a requirement. The most common colour was probably blue.

- The next insight is that, following the preliminary proclamation of emancipation on 22-Sep-1862 (published 23-Sep-1862 announced in detail 01-Jan-1863), it became (although this counted for less in Paris than London) even less likely that the British and French Empires would enter the war •. Although militarily important internally, given the 179,000 black northerners who joined the Union armed forces, the most important military consequence of emancipation was three. Foreign relations.

- A fourth reason for thinking US victory was inevitable was that President Davis, until May 1862, was opposed to offensives beyond the boundaries of the Confederate States (some argue that this was the strategy he should have stuck with though that view is mistaken). Probably Brigadier-General Gideon Jason Pillows' occupation of Columbus in Kentucky was the exception that proved President Davis' rule, but despite the Kentucky legislature voting 69 to 26 in favour of neutrality on 16-May-61 by the time Major General Polk ordered Pillow into Columbus on 04-Sep-61 circa 80% of Kentuckians were Unionist so declining to violate its neutrality was becoming redundant. That is four. The matter of strategy.

- That the Union had two and a third times more people and nine times more manufacturing was vital. On average throughout the war the Union fielded a 57% larger army. This is much less than the population difference would lead one to expect. In this sense the Confederacy militarised more deeply, and tried harder to win, than the Union but it was not enough to offset the Union's greater might. The Confederacy did export 30% more goods and services by value (US\$225 million - of which cotton was circa \$156 million) than the Union states (\$175



Fig. 6 Federal artillery caisson



These boxes contain circa three times the number of rounds kept in the limber which (by drill) stands closer to the piece than the caisson.

## 1. DEATH AND CAPTURE

Each primary played-for-character has secondary played-for-characters. Commonly, these would be a regimental second-in-command and an adjutant. The player experiences the battlefield through the eyes of both primary (a player can have more than one) and secondary (who have shorter range views of the battlefield) played-for-characters. The higher the rank of the primary character the greater the number of secondary played-for characters. This is partly because Brigadier-Generals and higher officers are accompanied by more aides-de-camp. If a regimental Colonel is killed or captured his Lt-Colonel will step up (and at the same time become the player's new primary played-for-character). If the regimental Lt-Colonel is also in his turn killed or captured the regimental Major will step up (at the same time becoming the primary played for character). If all such played-for characters, excluding aides-de-camp, are killed or captured the player is knocked out of the game altogether. In the case a brigadier-general is killed or captured he is replaced by a subordinate played-for-field-officer and so is out of the game forthwith.



million) in 1860 but this potential advantage, that the Confederacy possessed, was not as great as it needed to be even if trade had been maintained. Trade was not maintained. This is five. Let us call it Finance.

- The sixth nail in the coffin of any idea of an alternative outcome to the war was the Confederacy's squandering of its advantage in trade. For example, the Confederate cabinet's mistaken decision, in April 1861 (the month the US announced its intention to blockade Confederate ports), to reject Judah Benjamin's proposal to buy up 100,000 bales (50 million pounds weight or \$5 million of value), or more, of cotton and warehouse it in England for gradual sale over time to partially finance the war effort. The folly of rejecting this proposal, grossly inadequate to the scale of the task at hand though it was, was multiplied, from September 1861, when shipping out cotton would normally have begun, by the idea of forbidding the export of it. Forbidding cotton exports was never Confederate government policy. Instead, some state legislatures directed, and across the states unauthorised committees shamed, exporters into withholding their goods. Southern exports of cotton to Britain were down 97% in 1862 (the 61' crop) as compared with 1861 (the 60' crop). This embargo was so popular it more or less enforced itself from September 1861 to February 1862 (when shipping would normally have wound down). In spring 1862 half of the Southern cotton fields were growing food where they had previously grown cotton. This policy was the sort of self-destructive delusion that demonstrates what has been called the "cloistered cocoon that was Dixie". The damage to relations with the British (and French) Empires had already occurred by the time the movement's abject failure to have encouraged foreign recognition had become undeniable. The policy was never passed into law or even voted on by the Confederate Congress though it was discussed. In any case it is six. Failure in trade and relatedly in naval construction.

- In addition there were the operational decisions on the day of battle. The possibility that neither army, but certainly not the Confederacy, had the wherewithal to achieve a 19th century Cannae. This is seven.

In this section I have focused on imagining, and quantifying (in Table 1 and Table 2), changes that would have made Confederate independence more likely. There were also changes that the Union could have enacted to make its victory more rapid and complete. For example, issuing a proclamation of emancipation, say, one year earlier on 01-Jan-1862 as Secretary of State Seward, for one, was advocating. Some of the changes I imagine could have been mitigated by the Union. For example, imagine that if the French, Spanish or British Empires had recognised the

Confederacy the Union had then lifted its blockade of the Confederacy. This step would have prevented clashes with imperial warships. Lifting the blockade would have made the war harder to win but unlike the intervention of a major European power would most likely not have resulted, of itself, in Union defeat. I mention this illustratively. In practice it would have been politically impossible to have withdrawn the blockade (because of a foreign threat). On 01-Nov-1861, upon the retirement of Winfield Scott, George McClellan was appointed general-in-chief. On 11-Mar-62 Lincoln removed McClellan from the post of general-in-chief so as to enable him, officially, to focus on his new field command of the Army of the Potomac. McClellan was dismissed from this post too 23-Jul-62 after the failure of his imaginative Peninsular campaign. The Union cause would probably have been better served if McClellan had been given neither of these posts. The tables are more focused on what the Confederacy could have done differently than what the Union could have done differently. The main thing about them is their attempt to quantify variables.

### • ONE: BALANCE OF INFANTRY POWER

As well as the 34,800 ●● under McDowell at First Bull Run (of whom about 18,000 were actually committed to fighting the action) the Union had 18,000 men, in the Shenandoah under Robert Patterson, 5,500 New Jerseyites under Runyon ●●● between Bull Run and Washington D.C., 2,800 New Yorkers under McGunn at Runyon's disposal in Washington D.C., circa 3,800 District of Columbia Militia garrisoning Washington D.C., 900 men of the 7th Massachusetts just outside Washington and, I estimate, 8,000 across Delaware, Maryland and New Jersey (69,100 total in theatre). The Union had a further 117,900 men behind the front lines (perhaps 15,700 in Pennsylvannia and 20,300 in the Empire state) so 187,000 altogether. Therefore, even if all 18,000 men of the Union Army committed to action at Bull Run had become casualties (while 16,800 fell back on Washington) and a Confederate force of 24,000, out of 51,200 (including, say, 16,200 positioned across Virginia) in theatre, descended on Washington D.C. for those Confederates to capture, say, 29,800 Federals, secure in the fortifications around Washington (while, say, 10,000 rebels pinned down Patterson's 14,300), was, I estimate, two hundred times less likely than what actually happened. The prospects for bringing Maryland into the Confederacy, even after a Confederate (whose total troop strength, in July 1861, beyond the Virginia theatre, was about 88,800 for circa 140,000 altogether) victory, say, six times more crushing than their historical one, at First Bull Run, would have been bleak. This would have been even more true if a larger portion of the Federal Army than my imagined percentage (of circa fifty per cent) had managed to fall back (in



history ninety one per cent did). To capture Maryland, Delaware, and at least besiege Washington D.C., in, say, August 1861 the Confederates needed (at least) two smashing victories. One at Manassas, say, nine times greater than what they actually achieved and another, hot on its heels, either over Runyon and the retreating remnants of the Union Army or just the latter if Runyon had already fallen back on the Washington forts. Only with a nine times greater victory (call it a 3% chance) plus another smashing victory within three weeks (say a 1% chance of both) could they have secured, say, a one in five chance of storming and possessing Washington D.C. by August 1861. I quantify the odds of this and the Confederacy taking Maryland, Delaware, Washington D.C. New Jersey and Philadelphia by the end of October 1861 at 0.3% (three hundred and thirty three to one against).

Alternatively, having used the railways to concentrate two disparate armies against McDowell perhaps the Confederacy could have reversed the motion and, tight on the heels of First Bull Run, hit Patterson swiftly enough, with a large enough force, to wipe his army out before turning around, again, and investing Washington with no possible threat to their western flank? If so, they could only have afforded to spend about two weeks obliterating Patterson (who might have frustrated an attempt at obliteration by falling back) or else end up worse off thanks to the rivers of Union troops mobilising and deploying to the capital.

In the case Patterson's army was destroyed within two weeks of a massive First Bull Run victory, so by 05-Aug-61, the Confederates could have invested Washington with, at best, 52,400 men (all those in theatre plus 1,400 reinforcements from outside Virginia) against circa 44,000 Union (a third of the field armies, the reserves and 6,000 reinforcements). This disparity would only have been sufficient to lay down a siege. Alternatively, if they had achieved a Bull Run follow-up victory and faced Washington circa 28-Jul-61 with, say, 32,300 men (700 reinforcements, 8,100 from northern Virginia, 16,000 or 80% of the former army of the Potomac, 7,500 or 80% of the former army of the Shenandoah) while the Union defended with, say, 26,000 (and Patterson's 14,300 intact to the west) then Washington might still have repelled assault. With Washington invested the Confederates could have fought a war of manoeuvre while simultaneously besieging the capital. Let us note that the Union could have assembled a, say, 32,000 strong force to relieve the capital as soon as early October. Also the Union might have been able to supply Washington D.C. via the Potomac river.

In every case time was the Union's friend as far as the balance of infantry power is concerned.

From 01-Aug-1861 to 01-Nov-1861 Union reinforcements were reaching Washington D.C at the rate of circa 3,150 men per week (13,000 per month). A slow careful siege of Washington, even if Washington was cut off from reinforcements, would not have been in the Confederates best interest. The capitol, if possible, had to be stormed. The Confederate window of opportunity, had First Bull Run been a 19th century Cannae, say, nine times greater than in life was widest in the two weeks after First Bull Run. In the case the Confederates had managed to destroy at least seventy five per cent of the Union Bull Run field army (22,600) and also isolate and destroy Runyon's New Jerseyites in the open, in July or early August 1861, the Confederates would have had a circa forty per cent chance (with a 2:1 advantage of numbers) of overwhelming the Washington militia and McGunn's brigade (plus, say, 7,000 troops who had retreated to Washington) and storming the capital forthwith.

In fact, although they held the field at First Bull Run the Confederate victory was marginal (indeed you might say they were lucky to not be defeated). Our historical perspective on First Bull Run is conditioned by the relative slightness of the Confederate military achievement there. That conditioning is put aside by this alternative history which affords either side an opportunity to achieve the crushing victory, of the sort that could have saved four hundred thousand American soldiers from wounding, another six hundred thousand from death and have transformed the history, for the better or the worse, of the world. Confederate President Davis, arriving on the battlefield late in the day, was so excited by the seeming scale of the Confederate victory as to push for a remorseless pursuit to capitalise on the situation, effectively favouring a crossing into Maryland against his own policy of only repelling invasion while standing on the defensive, but the army was too shell shocked, elated at having lived, or exhausted in the one part, and ill positioned in the other, to pursue on 21-Jul-61.

Even if the Confederacy had, in July and August 1861, destroyed ten times as many men as it did, the Union would have replenished the losses by 01-Nov-61. This suggests that not only was the Confederacy's brightest chance to bring Maryland into the Confederacy (and capture Washington) the period July to September 1861, but also that even in this case the Union, with a new front established in Delaware, New Jersey and Pennsylvannia, would most likely not have forfeited ultimate victory.



## • TWO: THE POLITICAL WILL

In the case Washington D.C. had fallen by mid-August 1861 (and Maryland been taken into the Confederacy) the Civil War would still, initially, have carried on. The seat of the Federal government would have been relocated, probably, to Philadelphia or Boston. In such a case there would have been a greater chance, even a much greater chance, that the Confederacy would have achieved independence, because victories, early on, including the capture of Washington D.C. and Maryland, would have increased the chance of early Anglo-French recognition and/or intervention when it might have been most decisive early in the war.

Even had foreign intervention not occurred had Maryland (0.69 m. population at the time) fallen in August 1861 the Empire State's commitment to the conflict might have fractured. New York state was Unionist, having supported Lincoln over the Democratic Fusion ticket by 54% to 46% in the 1860 Presidential election, but New York City and Brooklyn (because they benefited heavily from southern trade and New York working men, unlike those further north, feared competition from southern labour if it was freed) was not. This does not mean, riots against conscription notwithstanding, New York City was Confederate. Neutralist rather. In 1861 New York City's (0.81 million) population (excluding Brooklyn) was about 3.6% of the Union states as a whole. If we imagine a victorious Confederate Army, that had captured Washington D.C. in August 1861, advanced from Maryland (0.69 million population) into Delaware (0.11 m. population) in September 1861, causing the relocated Federal government to flee, say, to Boston, carrying on into New Jersey (0.7 m. population) in October 1861 it is not hard to imagine that army adopting winter defensive lines in south east New York State north of, west of, and around New York City, Brooklyn (0.27 million population) and Philadelphia (0.6 million population) which latter they would have captured en route. For such an unfolding they would undoubtedly have had to win additional battles. Nonetheless, in this case, with circa 13.6% of the Unionist States population denied to the Union, and perhaps 7% added to the Confederacy, the demographic balance of power would have changed from 2.1: 1.0 to 1.9: 1.0. This might not seem decisive, but if you adjust for the fact that the Confederates conscripted a higher percentage of their population this reduces the long term servicemen advantage that the Union held over the Confederacy from 157% in history to 127% in this imagined world. That is more or less halving the Union's numeric lead in numbers of soldiers. It is possible to imagine a peace being struck in these circumstances as the Union fought on but without the overwhelming advantages of numbers that allowed it in reality

to grind the Confederacy down from 1863 onwards. It is also possible, naturally, that in such circumstances the Union would instead have been moved to mobilise a higher proportion of its population. However, even in a universe in which the Union's numeric advantage were, for a considerable period of time, halved, the Union would probably have won the Civil War given its greater power in depth. Under Lincoln it would not have lost the will to fight until at the earliest the mid-term elections of 1862 and then only if the war was going extremely badly. So even with a crushing early victory or victories leading to the secession of Maryland, Delaware and New Jersey and the occupation of Philadelphia, Brooklyn and New York City by January 1862 still the odds of early Confederate victories breaking the Union will to war looks, in the absence of foreign intervention, remote. Nonetheless, holding so much territory so early would have raised the chance, I estimate, of Confederate independence to 19.6% (independent of its increasing the chance of foreign intervention) in the wake of a series of spectacular Confederate victories.

### • **THREE: FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

Between 1861-63 the impact the military balance had on the outcome of the war arose, perhaps predominantly, from the possibility of early, more spectacular, Confederate military victories than in life, leading to British, French or Spanish recognition of the Confederacy. This, had it happened, would in turn have led those powers to demand the right to trade with the Confederacy in a manner consistent with the doctrine of freedom of the seas, and from this would have come clashes with the Union warships on blockade. Had such clashes led France into war with the Union the Confederate cause would have had a good chance of triumph. The population of France was 37 million to the Union's 22 million. Heavy industry production was similar in each nation with iron production, for example, being about 800,000 tons per annum in both. The French Navy, however, in January 1861 was far stronger than the Union navy. It had 39 screw three deckers, 36 screw frigates and corvettes, 56 screw sloops, 33 paddle frigates and corvettes, and 3 broadside ironclad capital ships of 16,000 tons combined, being 167 engine enabled warships not counting gunboats. The Union had 19 engine enabled warships not counting engine driven gunboats. Of these nineteen Union warships four were out of commission. All of these warships, on both sides, were facing imminent obsolescence in coastal combat which was about to be revolutionised by ironclad monitors. Monitors were not so seaworthy, however, as to be suitable for blue water sailing. Nonetheless they were about to render much of the existing naval arsenals redundant as most of the rest would be by broadside ironclad capital ships. *USS Monitor* was launched 30-Jan-62. Had the French gone to war with the Union in December 61' we can imagine



them, at least if they deployed their fleet forthwith, denying the Union the means to launch *USS Monitor* at all. Alternatively, having swept the seas clear of the Union Navy we can imagine the French hysteria upon *USS Monitor* emerging to play havoc with their warships within its range, at least until the French responded with construction in kind. The French could have built monitors (in Europe) as fast as the Union although for seaworthiness reasons would have had to instead finance the capacity at Confederate shipyards, say, in New Orleans, Louisiana or Norfolk, Virginia or at the large docks at Havana in Spanish Cuba.

In February 1862 Union forces numbered circa 350,000. The Confederate forces at the time were circa 230,000. The French army was circa 400,000. In the event of war with the Union France would have kept at least half of its army (200,000) in Europe and Africa (5,000 in the Papal States, 15,000 on the Spanish border, circa 35,000 deployed for internal security, circa 35,000 in North Africa, perhaps 30,000 in Alsace-Lorraine and 30,000 on the Italian border and 45,000 Imperial Guard). But given that it committed to deploying circa 3,000 troops to Mexico in January 1862 and 37,000 more troops to Mexico in March 1862 I think we can allow that France would have committed circa 70,000 troops, based on its capacity to oceanically transport at least 35,000 in one wave, to the Confederate cause, within four months (in two waves) of joining the war, if it were not yet in Mexico, down to 35,000 if it was. Meanwhile and in any case the French fleet would have broken the Federal blockade on the south. Indeed, if France had in turn imposed its own blockade on the north it might have been able to impair the construction of monitors by the Union navy. On the other hand, the French Empire might have refrained from blockading the Union ports so as not to antagonise the British Empire. Prioritising the garrisoning of France would have prevented the French Empire, initially, from bringing most of its strength to bare. However while France might have grown war weary over time it might instead have scaled its commitment up if things went wrong at first. I estimate its entry into the conflict would have tripled the chance of Confederate independence from 12.4% to 37.2%. This number bases about 30% of that improved chance of independence on the probability of France delivering command of the seas to the Confederacy (both in the form of amphibious mobility, France had the shipping to marine lift circa 35,000 men, at least if it was into a friendly port, and/or, so long as the British Empire accepted it, to blockade). In other words, if fear of the British Empire caused France to decline to blockade the north then the chance of Confederate independence with French intervention would still rise from 12.4% but only to 33.5%. The north was much less reliant on overseas trade in absolute terms than the south so most of the benefit of French naval superiority would have been in the freedom to open new army fronts behind the lines and to enable Confederate government revenue to increase as a result of trade. I would allow for the chance to rise to 49.6% if France doubled down on its commitment and increased its army strength in North America to, say, 140,000 (more likely by raising additional troops

than by withdrawing a higher percentage of the army from Europe, Africa and elsewhere). Controlling the seas would have allowed the French to threaten to, or actually to, drop 35,000 strength forces anywhere along the coast forcing the Union to disperse its army to defend ports such as Boston, Baltimore, New York, Philadelphia and Wilmington (which in 1868 was building more iron ships than the rest of the USA combined), especially if this was all happening because the latter four cities had already been captured. Capture of the mid-Atlantic coast would make the rest of the north east coast even more important for the Union to defend. If the allied (Confederate-French) army forces were 300,000 to 370,000 versus 350,000 Union then the outcome of the war would have been hard to predict. The allies with a combined population of 46 million more than twice the Union's would have had the greater strength in depth albeit potentially struggling to overcome disadvantages arising from the distance between France and North America. A distance which in some respects would have cut both ways. The Union would have found it exceedingly hard to force the French Empire to cease and desist.

Foreseeing such circumstances, if they were losing the war on land, the Union might have lifted the blockade of the Confederacy before clashes with France could occur thus denying France a *casus belli*. Halting the Union blockade might have increased the Confederacy's chance of victory by, say, sixty seven per cent (so to 19.8% in 1861) not just because Confederate government revenue could have been massively increased (by tariffs on trade) but also because increased revenue would potentially have supported increased borrowing. The effect of free trade with the Confederacy in year one on the war's outcome would have been a little greater than that if it were not for the fact that the Confederate prohibition on cotton sales to Europe meant the Confederacy's main export was failing to yield any revenue anyway. Full trade at 1860 levels would have increased the Confederates real government revenue by a factor of about nine as against reality by 1863.

On the other hand, if the Union had declined to lift the blockade, in combination with the loss of Maryland, New Jersey, Delaware, Philadelphia, Wilmington and New York City, then war with either France or Britain or both would have been quite likely, certainly up until August 1862 and would have continued to be high with France for perhaps about a year thereafter. I think it doubtful that the Union would have agreed to lift the blockade whatever the circumstances. More likely the British would have legislated to limit their traders from flouting it. But if they did not conflict could not have been avoided, even after September 1862, since the British government could not accept repeated seizure of British merchantmen by the Union navy in the case that Britain had recognised the Confederate government as legitimate. This recognition was, however, very unlikely without improbable early Confederate victories on land and almost inconceivable after the preliminary



Proclamation of the Abolition of Slavery in September 1862. This is why it was France that was more likely to have acted differently than it did not Britain. Contrary to the historical consensus that France was bound to follow the British lead the Emperor Napoleon was always pursuing a France first policy••. Although that did not countenance war with Britain it certainly did not exclude independent action. This is proven by the French invasion of Mexico which the British refused to participate in once they understood Napoleon's intentions. The force that landed in Vera Cruz on 08-Dec-61 consisted of 6,000 Spanish troops, 3,000 French and 800 British but the French admiral in charge of the allied force had secret orders to march on Mexico City with or without Spain and Britain if the Mexican monarchist party did not immediately declare for the French puppet ruler of Mexico Maximilian. We probably do have to consider Maximilian a puppet since Napoleon III brazenly lied to him claiming British support was secured when in fact it was known that it was not available at all. More generally, it seems likely that it was the influence of Napoleon III's two successive Ministers of Foreign affairs that really explains France not intervening in the American Civil War••• and that without that influence the Emperor would have recognised the Confederacy, mostly likely in November 1861, with war resulting sometime in or around January 1862.

The Spanish army was 130,000 strong (with 70,000 reserves) in 1860••••. With the ability in 1861 to deploy 40,000 overseas or at least 20,000 across the Atlantic, without calling up reserves, and having more than 30,000 in the Caribbean already Spain could have entered the Civil War in 1861 with about 35,000 marine mobile infantry especially if debouching into friendly Confederate ports. The Spanish navy had 3 screw frigates, 5 screw sloops and 3 paddle frigates so 11 engine powered warships not counting its 26 paddle gunboats and 35 sailing warships. This force was about 75% as strong as the US navy. Like the US navy it lacked ironclad ships of the line. The Spanish began a major expansion of the navy in 1861 but this programme did not launch ironclad ships of line into the fleet until 1863 (when two were launched). At the same time, however, the Union was massively expanding its naval and ironclad forces. In 1862 it launched 17 engine powered warships including three ironclads not counting 12 paddle wheel gunboats and 23 screw driven gunboats but it laid down 29 ironclads. The USN was outbuilding the Spanish navy at a rate of about ten to one. In early 1863 the U.S.N. invited the Spanish naval attaché in Washington to the Brooklyn Navy Yard to report on its ironclads programme. The aim being to intimidate Spain away from contemplation of intervention on the Confederate side. The Spanish navy was a significant threat to the Union in July 1861 but it was unlikely to be strong enough to turn the tables on the Union at sea probably less so in 1862 and it would have severely outclassed from 1863 onwards. On the other hand, if 30,000 Spanish troops had landed from boats on the Potomac south east of Washington or at Alexandria on 21-Jul-1861 that would have put a cat among the sparrows.

Spain and the Confederacy were natural allies. Spain did not abolish slavery in Puerto Rico until 1873 and did not abolish it in Cuba until 1888. Spain was afraid of the USA and would have gladly seen it weakened by being broken up. Spain was, however, suspicious of long term Confederate intentions knowing that much of the clamour for US expansion at Spain's expense before the Civil War had come from politicians in Dixie. As a result it hesitated to take the Confederate side. More importantly, and by contrast with France, Spain did not consider itself strong enough to take action against the Union if there were any chance that the Union might win the war. In the case France had entered the Civil War Spain would probably have done so too. It was, however, deeply reluctant to take the risk of backing the Confederacy by itself and if it had done that would probably not have been decisive.

#### • FOUR: STRATEGY

Davis's opposition to the offence did not last. Once Lee was appointed commander of the army of Northern Virginia on 01-Jun-62 it was not long before the Confederates took up the offensive. But this could have happened a year earlier. Although it would have required President Davis to instruct Lee to be aggressive. In reality Lee was careful to insist, particularly in the crucial period May and June 1861, that the army remain on a defensive footing..... strategically for so long as those were the orders he was receiving from Governor Letcher initially and President Davis once Virginia joined the Confederacy in late May 61'. Virginia's referendum on secession was not held until 23-May-1861. We may speculate that it was only gradually that Lee came to conclude that no allies were riding to the rescue to justify a defensive strategy. His own thinking probably did not embrace the strategic offensive until December 1861 (after the November 1861 Trenton incident had failed to cause a rupture between the Union and the West European empires) at the earliest. Robert Edward Lee was put in charge of coastal defences from South Carolina to Florida a post to which he had been appointed 05-Nov-1861 arguably as a punishment for his miserable failure when given the West Virginia field command circa 05-Sep-61. Lee was appointed military advisor to President Davis 11-Apr-62. It may be that once he held this post he had time to compose his commitment to the strategic offensive but that it was Davis that held Lee back while he held this role or perhaps he brought Davis round to his own way of thinking. In any event, on 02-Jun-62 Lee was made c-in-c of *The Army of Northern Virginia*, and in this role committed to a new more aggressive strategy. Perhaps if Lee had been allowed to organise *The Army of Northern Virginia* in January 1862 instead of being sent to the coast this would have changed the war's outcome.

We might say that at *The Seven Days Battle* (16-Jun-62 to 02-Jul-62), at *Antietam* (17-Sep-62) or even at *Gettysburg* (01-Jul-63



to 03-Jul-63) it was not too late for Confederate military victories, if they were great enough, to end the war. Alternatively, had Jackson (who did not like frontal assaults as much as Lee) been given the field army command in either or both of these two cases, instead of Lee, it is possible that the south might have won those imaginary great victories. The advantage for the Confederates of deploying on Union soil was that foraging allowed for a more mobile form of warfare with a lighter logistical element. The more mobile side could concentrate more effectively and the best foraging was on Union territory. Also taking Union territory would hurt Union production while distracting the Union from hurting Confederate production. Had the Confederacy, for example, taken New York City the Union's ability to borrow money in late 1861 would have been crippled as war financing was mostly obtained from the New York Banks in year one of the war. Had the Confederacy taken Wilmington they might have been able to outproduce the Union in monitors. I believe if Lee had been given the command of the army of Northern Virginia on 01-Jan-62 and advanced out of the Confederacy fighting a war of movement the odds of Confederate victory in the war would have increased from, say, 10% to, say, 16%. The core of my argument is that unless defeated in the 08-Nov-1864 Presidential elections Lincoln was never going to recognise the Confederacy. The only way the Confederacy could survive was by forcing him to negotiate through victorious offensives. It is true that a more effective defence (avoiding the twin disasters that were Antietam and Gettysburg) might have led to a McClellan victory in the 08-Nov-64 election (in reality McClellan lost by 45% to 55% of the vote). But by 08-Nov-1864 the economic collapse of the Confederacy was so far advanced that even if the Democrats won the Presidential election it is doubtful the Confederacy could have survived. McClellan, in any case, was a war Democrat which meant he was opposed to immediate ceasefire. His party did, admittedly, favour one possibly including some localised to the south reduction in Federal powers or even secession. But McClellan favoured a negotiated peace, not an immediate ceasefire, and although he was willing to concede on matters to do with slavery to get it he was unlikely, highly unlikely, to negotiate secession from the Union. Moreover, reversing the Proclamation of the abolition of slavery nearly two years after it happened would have been very difficult. The outcome of an interaction of these two views of McClellan's on the one hand, and his party's on the other, was by no means certain to leave the Confederacy in existence given how imminent its military collapse was in the winter of 1864.

## • FIVE: FUNDING A VAST ARMY (finance and economics)

From the first shot at Sumter (fired by Edmund Ruffin) time was running out for the Confederacy but even more so by 17-Sep-1862 and the battle of *Antietam*. Already by October 1862 the Federal government was spending \$445 million per year annualised. By contrast the Confederacy's real (adjusted for inflation) spending in the four months December 1861 to March 1862 was \$51 million (annualised \$204 million), but by August to December 1862 it was down 35% to \$43 million (annualised \$129 million) in real terms and it continued to decline from then on as the Confederate economy unravelled. Inflation in the Confederate states was already at 135% by October 1862 (later hyperinflation set in). The mounting strength of the Union, particularly through its ability to raise long term (5-20 year) borrowing was approaching the unstoppable. What this means is that in order to win the Confederacy had to do so within the first two and a half years of the war (ideally within the first 12 months). This statement is contrary to the belief that the Confederacy could have won by a more effective defence, the eschewing of Lee's costly offensives which shattered, on that view, at Antietam a leaning in Britain toward joining the war. Instead the Confederacy could have waited for the Union will to fight to crack in the 1864 election. Actually a long war was not in the South's interest precisely because its economy was unravelling at an accelerating speed. It is also uncertain what effect a huge Confederate victory at *Antietam* or at *The Seven Days Battle* would have had on the British willingness to extend recognition to the Confederacy. The offensive strategy was sound, or could have been if better fought and embarked on sufficiently in advance of the proclamation of the abolition of slavery. The proclamation was a disaster for the Confederate cause since whatever the outcome of the war, even if the Democrats had won the November 1864 election, they would have found it very difficult to role the declaration back. This in turn would have made a negotiated peace much harder.

The Confederates had to win the war before the preliminary proclamation of abolition in September 1862 certainly before the state of the Union address of January 1863 when the full details of abolition were settled on. This was because it became the main obstacle to securing an alliance with the British Empire. Particularly with Jackson (whose generalship was probably superior to Lee's) commanding the main field army more successfully France might have been induced to raise the US blockade up to the end of 1863 (France had abolished slavery throughout its territories in 1848 and more to the point the Emperor was hostile to it but it was not his pain consideration). But



the Confederate economy was crashing as early as December 1862 when inflation was running at 160% annualised even at the same time as the price of slaves, because the market had lost confidence in the Confederacy's ability to survive, was falling.

If Britain and France recognised the Confederacy they probably would have no longer been willing, without a fight, to allow the Union to prevent trade with it. Defence of freedom of the seas would probably have precipitated an allied intervention and if the Confederacy could trade its ability to finance the war would have increased by almost an order of magnitude in due course.

Of the two powers Britain and France, it was France that was more drawn to intervention. France was keenest to intervene with British backing but the Emperor favoured unilateral action in the absence of British support. Unfortunately for the Confederacy the Emperor's ministers did not. However if, by 31-Dec-1861, the Confederacy held Maryland, New York City and Philadelphia perhaps France, even while Britain held back for sympathy with the cause of abolition, would have decided to hazard independent action, motivated also by its desire to secure Mexico following the 08-Dec-1861 Anglo-French-Spanish allied intervention there (to ensure Mexico's payment of its international debt after Mexico called a moratorium on interest payments). More likely, in Paris, the intervention was part of a larger plan to control Mexico and protect its American colonies. The Spanish occupied Vera Cruz from 21-Dec-1861 and Anglo-French forces arrived there on 07-Jan-1862. On 09-Apr-62 the allies fell into dispute and the British decided to withdraw from Mexico. By contrast the French committed to reinforcing their position with 30,000 fresh troops arriving in July 1862. Following conquest of the major cities of Mexico on 10-Apr-64 the second Mexican Empire was established under the military protection of the Second French Empire. The intervention of France in the Civil War, even without British involvement, would quite likely, though not probably, have resulted in Confederate victory. If French intervention happened in late 1861 it might have prevented the invasion of Mexico freeing the French intervention effort to focus solely on the Civil War. If it had happened in early 1862 it might have been combined with the operation in Mexico and potentially been less decisive as a result. But it is unlikely the French could have merely dabbled in a war with the Union. Left to their own devices Unionist privateers and the Union navy were likely to cross the Atlantic and cause France immense embarrassment. To forestall that France would surely have entered the war, if it did at all, with a massive redeployment of naval strength to Confederate and

Caribbean ports for operations against the north east coastline of North America. Defeat of the American by the French navy, even without any action by the French army, would have altered the trajectory of history even if it did not lead to Confederate independence.

- **SIX: THE CLOISTERED COCOON THAT WAS DIXIE**

Why did the Confederacy never consider offering emancipation, say, in exchange for male slaves aged 18-28 volunteering to join the army, if the rebellion was about states rights? Conversely, if the rebellion was really about slavery why did the southern states argue in terms of a state's right to dissolve its Union with other states? Why did the Confederacy never consider, thereby ensuring that its finances rapidly collapsed in the war that unfolded, a significant income (or other direct) tax? The Union introduced an income tax of 3% for any amount of income above \$800 per annum in August 1861. In the same month the Confederacy introduced an income tax of 0.5%. It was to be collected by the states, but only South Carolina really obliged. A total of \$100,000 was raised. When Judah Benjamin suggested the cotton bales plan to finance a war that might last for a year if not more not the months that most people expected why was it dismissed, even as a contingency, by the rest of the Confederate cabinet? The reason is that the Confederacy did not grasp the scale of the task it had set itself. It was insensitive within its cocoon. The South might have won the civil war. In a universe of alternative universes it would only rarely do so. Perhaps the single largest reason for this was that it did not face the bitter truth. It preferred sweet lies - a cloister of its own devising from which it could be dragged only by the reality of defeat. It would have taken a greater degree of honesty than Dixie could marshal to admit that partial emancipation was the single step it could have taken that would have most certainly and decisively increased its chance of victory. With less slavery to polish the tarnished Confederate cause in British eyes it is likely that Prime Minister Palmerston would have recognised the Confederacy. Indeed, following the dispatch to the British embassy in Washington of his note of protest at the Union seizure of *The Trent* in November 1861 the Prime Minister himself predicted that war with the Union was now probable revealing, perhaps, unwittingly or otherwise, that his note sought to bring this about. The British ambassador (who favoured peace) succeeded, by paraphrasing it, in toning down the protest note to the point where the Union could turn the other cheek. But even if Britain had not intervened had the Confederacy raised volunteer black slaves, aged 18-28, in return for freedom after five years of service (so 10% not



100% emancipation) the Confederate army might have mustered a further 190,000 men to the colours. The South had to have its cake and eat it. It was too confident in itself to assess the dire chance of retribution if it carried on ahead like a horse wearing blinkers straight over the cliff of history.

"Edmund Ruffin, the seventy-one-year old agronomist and radical secessionist who fired the first shot at Sumter fled into the woods just before Lee's surrender...Eight of his eleven children were dead as was his favourite daughter-in-law. His whole remaining capital, loyally invested in Rebel securities, was gone and so was his dream of an independent South...Later returning to his son's house..." (N.B. his own had been seized) "...in his room upstairs where he normally worked on his twenty five volume diary he draped a Confederate flag about his shoulders, and, as he recorded, he felt his doubts and fears melt away. Grasping his pen, that he had wielded as a successions sword, he affirmed, once, more, "I here repeat, and would willingly proclaim, my unmitigated hatred to Yankee rule." Then he placed the muzzle..." (N.B. of his firearm) "...in his mouth and departed a changed world he wanted no part of."

## • SEVEN: OPERATIONS

The main operational failing of the Confederates at First Bull Run was not utilising more of their army. In particular in such a way as to cut off the Union retreat. The main contribution of Bonham, Longstreet, Jones, Ewell and Holmes with circa 13,500 men between them, was to pin Davies and Richardson, with circa 5,000, in place. This was a very poor use of forty five per cent of the Confederate army. Especially since the credit for this must go to Union general McDowell who returned Davies and Richardson to Blackburn's ford, after the action there on the 19th July, with the intention of pinning much larger Confederate forces in place exactly as occurred. The Confederate brigadier-general Cocke (3,000 men) was also under-utilised despite having been ordered, with Bonham, to attack Centreville. The glaring problem here was that the order did not say when to attack but rather that the time would be announced in a subsequent order. It wasn't. Instead it was superseded by an order to defend "to the last extremity". ●●●●●

It was unfortunate for the Confederates that the man, Colonel Jordon Beauregard's chief-of-staff, who normally

would have written the army's orders in a clear and concise manner, was unconscious after the HQ physician, observing his exhaustion, had prescribed a narcotic to make him sleep. Beauregard, having found Jordon slumped over his desk had kindly decided to post a guard to make sure the sleep was uninterrupted. Instead Beauregard himself dictated, to Johnston's chief of staff, a set of vague orders which were presented to General Johnston for signature at circa 4.50 a.m. (first light that day was 4.39 a.m.). At such a time Johnston must have presumed it was too late to change them. We know he was unhappy with them having expected Jackson, Bartow and Bee to have been moved overnight to the left behind Cocke. Had it happened this might have made the Union's defeat more severe. This would have been especially likely if the one of them on the left behind Cocke, had they been there, had defended Sudley Springs and potentially moved, towing the others with him, to defeat the Union in detail as they came at it.

Moreover, the disposition of Longstreet et al. was such as to afford them the geographical opportunity to cross Bull Run, say, at McClellan's ford, and advance north east, avoiding Richardson and Davies altogether, to bag the Union army at its moment of (potential) retreat. So long as Bonham put on a good demonstration to hold Richardson and Davies in place this movement could have been effected by Longstreet, Jones and Ewell or, even, just by Jones and Ewell (perhaps with Holmes). Alternatively, the latter two, three or four could have advanced along the Alexandria railway due east cutting north at some point to prevent the Union army from reforming east of Centreville as it in life did. The four together might even have been sufficient to defeat Runyon had they brought him to battle even further east. This could in turn have left Washington with inadequate defences if the bulk of the Union army had been taken at First Bull Run.

Assuming a shallower movement, with three brigades, they might have even done both advancing Longstreet and Jones to the east of Centreville and Ewell and Holmes east along the railway. This might have required Davies and Richardson to have remained supine and the Union reserve in Centreville not to have realised what was happening, but even if Davies and Richardson had woken up and, say, decided to overrun Bonham they would have found it difficult given the size of his brigade and the topographical advantages of his position. Alternatively, if the Union had moved to block such an outflanking movement and prevented it the Confederates would have been little worse off. Such a movement to the Union rear would have put 6,500-8,500 men in the ideal place to turn the Union collapse



into a grave rout with many more prisoners taken. Conceivably, Jones and Ewell might have manoeuvred more locally to take Davies and Richardson in the flank while Bonham and Longstreet took them head on. If this had resulted in Davies and Richardson being smashed it might have freed all four brigades on the Confederate right to exploit and compound a general Union rout.

The main operational failing of the Union at First Bull Run was failing to launch its attack sooner.

Tyler's division, in particular, was instructed to demonstrate before the Stone Bridge and it did. But it also fell for Evan's bluff to the effect that the bridge was significantly defended when in fact, after Evans headed north west, it was not. Tyler could have stormed, or attempted to storm, the bridge long before he did. Tyler's division could also have outflanked the bridge. Sherman's brigade, for example, could have crossed at one of the fords slightly to the north of the bridge while Schenk's brigade simultaneously assaulted the bridge directly. A direct assault would not have been easy in the face of the Confederate abattis. Nonetheless, this, because Evans's brigade was small should have carried the position even if Evans had been defending it in full but especially since he more or less was not at all.

If the Union had crossed at Stone Bridge earlier they could have taken the Confederate defence in its right flank before it had time to gather strength and defeated it in detail leading to the successful implementation of McDowell's bold plan to take the Confederate army in the rear by a sweeping right hook.

Hunter's and Heintzelman's Divisions were also too slow. This might have been offset if they had begun their march an hour or two earlier, or if they had found their way to the track through the woods that they were under instruction to follow and missed or perhaps, as I think (history is unclear as to which applies) is more plausible, chose to avoid (in the hope of not being observed in their movement by their enemy).

In the early stages of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions going into action their regiments were deployed in penny packets blunting their effectiveness. Having said that we should note that they did almost overwhelm the defence. The fact is the battle was close fought and casualties were similar on each side until the Union right flank routed. Had the Union won a convincing victory it is quite likely, if not probable, that the war would have ended in 1861.